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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant ('Taylor") did preserve the issues raised on appeal. The City
claims that Taylor failed to properly raise the issues regarding the discovery violation;
however, this is not the case. Taylor's counsel did raise this issue in the trial court. Taylor's
counsel informed the trial court that he had never received a copy of the written statement
given by Braithwaite, didn't know of its existence until cross-examination, and should have
been timely provided with it in response to discovery. (Rec. 62, p. 22, lines 1-4).
The City also claims that Taylor failed to preserve the insufficiency of the City's
evidence. However, this was a bench trial making it necessary for the trial court to make
findings that each element of the offense is supported by the required quantum of evidence.
The sufficiency of the evidence, is therefore, preserved for review. State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d
1252 (Ut.App. 2000).
Taylor did marshal the evidence presented before the trial court by setting forth
the evidence and the testimony of all the witnesses in Appellant's Brief. After citing the
testimony, Taylor correctly points out that the trial court found against Taylor, not based on
the testimony presented at trial, but on mere conjecture. The evidence, even when marshaled,
fails to support the conviction in this case. Conjecture by the trial court, cannot support a
criminal conviction and cannot be a substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Spanish
Fork City v. Brvan. 975 P.2d 501, 504. (Ut.App. 1999).
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The prosecution failed to disclose the written statement received from
Braithwaite, the one witness that the court allegedly relies on, because of his independence.
This matter was brought to the court's attention, as required under Rule 16(g) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16(g) does not require that counsel seek a continuance, but
rather provides that the court may grant a continuance, or other remedy, such as prohibiting
a party from introducing the undisclosed evidence; if the violation is brought to the court's
attention at any time during the course of the proceeding. The discovery violation in this case,
was brought to the court's attention during the course of the proceeding.
There is a reasonable likelihood that this information would have changed the
outcome of the case. This information goes directly to the credibility of the one witness the
court claims it relied on, because of his apparent unbiased opinion. If the information would
have been provided in a timely manner, Taylor could have prepared for this witness and could
have shown that Braithwaite was not an unbiased witness, but had been kicked out of Taylor's
business in the past for violating club rules, and was therefore biased against Taylor. Such a
failure, under the circumstances of this case, was prejudicial and warrants reversal of the
conviction. State v. Martin. 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999).

5

ARGUMENT
I.

TAYLOR DID PRESERVE THE ISSUES
RAISED ON APPEAL

The City claims that Taylor failed to preserve the issues regarding the City's
discovery violation and the insufficiency of evidence, by failing to raise these issues in the trial
court proceeding. However, these issues were sufficiently preserved for appeal.
A, Discovery Issue:
After learning at trail, during cross-examination, of the written statement
Braithwaite had previously given to the prosecutor, Taylor's counsel states as follows:
MR. BOND: Your Honor, I certainly think that that would have
been relevant information that should have been provided in my
discovery and I have not been provided with it. This is the first
that I've heard about it." (Rec. 62, p. 22, lines 1-4).
Therefore, the City's failure to disclose this information in violation of the rules
of discovery, and the prosecutor's duty to disclose, was raised before the trial court, during the
proceedings, and thus was preserved for review by this Court.
B. Sufficiency of Evidence:
Since this matter was a bench trail, Taylor does not need to rely on the plain
error rule, to preserve the sufficiency of evidence claim for appeal. Whenfindingsof fact are
made in a criminal case by the bench, without a jury, the question of sufficiency of evidence
may be raised, whether or not the party raising the question has made an objection to such
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findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for
a new trial. State v. Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 ft.nt. 4 (Ut.App. 2000).
In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the appellate court determines if
each element of the charged offense is supported by the required quantum of evidence. Id. at
1252, citing Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvant. 975 P.2d 501 (Ut.App. 1999). Because the trial
court, infindingthe defendant guilty of the charged offenses, madefindingsand conclusions,
regarding each element, Taylor's claim is preserved. State v. Larsen, supra at 1255.
Furthermore, it is the City's burden of establishing each element of the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501 (Ut.App.
1999), Taylor's counsel did argue to the trial court that the City had failed to meet this burden,
based on the evidence presented at trial.
In closing, Taylor's counsel argues:
(MR. BOND) "No.l, Idon'tthink that they've met their burden"
(Rec. 62, p. 107 lines 9-10).
Therefore, the sufficiency of evidence claim was raised in the trial court, and
since this was a bench trial, this issue is preserved for a full review by this Court.
II.

TAYLOR DID MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

A party marshals the evidence by citing the evidence and testimony of all the
witnesses. State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Ut.App. 2000). This was all set forth in
Appellant's Brief. This was not a long or complicated case. The City called three witnesses:
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(1) alleged victim, Michael Breck, (2) Joshua Braithwaite, and (3) Police Officer Aaron
Arslanian. Taylor testified and called Gary Holstein and Patrick Nelligan.
Taylor did marshal the evidence, by identifying all the witnesses who testified
and the substance of each testimony. This is contained in the Statement of Facts, of
Appellant's Brief. However, the trial court did not rely on any of the witnesses' statements,
except for the testimony of Braithwaite. The trial court then failed to makefindingsconsistent
with the facts as testified to by Braithwaite, but speculated and through conjecture, made up
its own version of what may have happened.
The City while claiming that Taylor has failed to marshal all the evidence
presented at trial, has failed to identify any witness, or cite to any evidence presented, which
Taylor has not already set forth in Appellant's Brief. Taylor has marshaled the evidence in this
case.
III.

THE CONVICTION OF BATTERY BASED
ON SPECULATION IS INSUFFICIENT.

The trial court's ruling was not based on a totality of the evidence, but on
speculation. At the end of the trial, the trial court did not total the evidence, rather it
disregarded all the evidence and witnesses, except Braithwaite. (Rec. 62, p. 110) The court
then found contrary to Braithwaite's testimony and began speculating as to the facts. (Rec. 62,
p. 110).
Before a conviction is upheld, "it must be supported by a quantum of evidence
concerning each element of the crime as charged, from which the [factfinder] may base its
8

conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah
1980). In addition, "[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that
give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." State v. Workman. 852 P.2d 981,
985 (Utah 1993).
In this case, the trial court did not place any weight on the testimony of Taylor
or the alleged victim, or the other witnesses. The trial court relied on one person, Braithwaite.
However, the court did not find the facts as Braithwaite testified, but rather proceeded on
inference and speculation, that "there was touching that occurred." (Rec. 62. p. 110). This
speculation is not based on sufficient evidence for the fact finder to find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980).
Furthermore, Taylor was charged with criminal Battery under Salt Lake City
Code § 11.08.020 "in that the defendant wilfully used unlawful force or violence upon the
person of another." (See Amended Information, Rec. 49). The trial court's speculation that
"there was touching that occurred" is not sufficient for a battery under the criminal code, and
certainly not as "unlawful force" or "Violence" under the Salt Lake City Code. Every time a
person is "touched" a crime does not occur. The touching must be offensive to the person, and
there must be an intentional threat or attempt to do bodily harm. State v. Duncan, 593 P.2d
427 (Kan.App. 1979).
In this case there was no threat or attempt to do bodily harm. No evidence was
presented of any physical threat or bodily harm. The court also, did not find the so-called
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"touching" to be offensive to the alleged victim, and in fact threw out the testimony of the
alleged victim as being totally biased and very selective (Rec. 62, p 108, lines 18-23), leaving
the court with "one person's testimony, Mr. Braithwaite." (Rec. 62, p. 110, lines 3-4). Mr.
Braithwaite could not, and did not, testify that the touching was offensive to the alleged victim.
Furthermore, such speculation, given the testimony of the other witnesses, is
against the clear weight of the evidence. Braithwaite did not have the best opportunity to view
the incident. He was driving in the area at 15-20 mph when he happened to "glance" over his
left shoulder. He didn't notice the vehicles parked on 600 West that all the other witnesses
described. He also never saw the alleged victim grabbed by the shoulders as described by the
alleged victim. Rather, he testified that the alleged victim was being shoved six to eight times,
with shoves to the chest; and that it was not just a single time, but several times; and that with
each shove the alleged victim was taking 2-3 steps back. This is contrary to all the other
testimony, including the alleged victim, himself; who claimed that he was grabbed and twisted
by the Defendant once.
Moreover, the testimony of Braithwaite not only contradicted the testimony of
the other witnesses, but was also inconsistent with his own written statement, which was never
disclosed to Taylor's counsel prior to trial. For example, in his written statement Braithwaite
states he was driving down the street and glanced over and saw the owner of the place grab this
"employie" [sic] and shove him off the property. He also reported that he stopped and talked
to both of them and asked if everything was OK. At trial he testified he never saw Taylor grab
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the alleged victim and that he only talked to the alleged victim after the incident. He also
testified that afterwards Taylor immediately left and went inside the building.
Criminal convictions cannot rest on conjecture or supposition. They must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither possibilities nor probabilities can
substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Spanish Fork Citv v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501,
504 (Ut.App. 1999), citing State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d at 402 ("Criminal convictions may not
be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from
which the jury may base its conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt"); See also State v. George,
481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971).
To find that speculative inferences can constitute proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is to attack one of the most sacred constitutional safeguards at its core. State v.
Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 987 (Utah 1993). When an inference of guilt does not logicaUy flow
from the evidence, it is incumbent on the reviewing court to set the verdict aside. Id. at 987.

IV. THE DISCOVERY MATTER WAS BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIAL COURT
BY TAYLOR'S COUNSEL UNDER RULE 16(g).
Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require that a party
make a motion for a continuance. The Rule states as follows:
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceeding it is
brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to
comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the
11

partyfromintroducing the evidence not disclosed, or it may enter
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
Therefore, under Rule 16(g) a party is only required to bring the violation to the
attention of the court during the course of the proceeding. The court is then given discretion
under Rule 16(g) to prohibit the evidence, grant a continuance, or enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
After learning at trail, during cross-examination, of the written statement
Braithwaite had previously given to the prosecutor, Taylor's counsel states as follows:
MR. BOND: Your Honor, I certainly think that that would have
been relevant information that should have been provided in my
discovery and I have not been provided with it. This is the first
that Fve heard about it." (Rec. 62, p. 22, lines 1-4).
Therefore, the discovery violation was brought to the trial court's attention,
during the course of the proceeding, and Rule 16(g) was complied with in this case.
V.

THE CITY'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE WAS
PREJUDICIAL AND HARMFUL ERROR-

Rule 16 of the Utah R. of Crim. P. governs the disclosure of evidence in a
criminal case. Rule 16(a)(4) requires the disclosure of evidence known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and (5) requires the disclosure of any other item
of evidence which the court determines on good cause should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. Rule 16(b) requires that
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the disclosure be made a soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the
defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make such disclosures.
In the case of State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the prosecutor under Rule 16 must: (1) either produce all of the material
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the request for which no responsive
material will be provided; and (2) must continue to disclose such material on an ongoing basis
to the defendant. Id. Due process requires the state to disclose even unrequested information,
which may or may not be exculpatory. State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839 (Utah 1988). Cf.
Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F.Supp 1151 (D.Utah 1999) (under this rule, which imposes a broader
disclosure obligation on the prosecutor than does the federal rule, the prosecutor is obligated
to make disclosure on a continuing basis without a request).
In State v. Knight, supra, the Court went on to say that such an error warrants
reversal only if it is '"harmful," i.e., "only if a review of the record persuades the court that
without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant." Id. The question is therefore, first, whether the defendant was entitled to the
information and, second, if he was, whether that information would create a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result such that the confidence in the outcome is undermined.
State v. Martin, 984 P.2d 975 (Utah 1999).
To the first prong there is no question, but that the concealed evidence in this
case, would have been admissible. It was a written statement made by an alleged witness to
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the incident. The evidence was in fact admitted by the trial court, after it was discovered to
exist by the Defendant in the middle of the trial. Focusing on the second prong, the
information may have affected the outcome of the case, if it would have been provided in a
more timely manner.
Failure to disclose in a timely manner is not harmless error in this case, as
Braithwaite is the only witness that the trial court relied on in finding the Defendant guilty.
The written statement had important information and facts that were inconsistent with
Braithwaite's testimony at trial; and which ultimately resulted in the discovery of Braithwaite's
bias and prejudice against Taylor. This may have affected the outcome, as the court relied on
Braithwaite's testimony in large part, based on his assumed independence. This assumption
could have been challenged at trial, had the written statement been produced timely. Such
strong impeachment evidence would go to the central issue of the case, and Braithwaite's
credibility on the stand. This is not harmless error. State v. Martin. 984 P.2d 975 (Utah
1999).
CONCLUSION
Taylor did adequately preserve in the trial court, the issues raised on appeal.
These issues are subject to full review. Taylor did marshal the evidence by citing to each
witness and their testimony. Taylor did comply with Rule 16(g) by putting the trial court on
notice of the discovery violation during the course of the trial.
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The trial court based its reliance on Braithwaite's testimony as an unbiased and
independent witness. If the information would have been timely disclosed, Taylor could have
shown that this witness was not independent, but was in fact, biased against the Defendant.
This information would have had a reasonable effect on the outcome of the case.
The trial court did not make its ruling based on the totality of the evidence, but
disregarded the testimony of all the witnesses but one, Braithwaite. The court then failed to
find consistent with Braithwaite's testimony, but found Taylor guilty, based on the court's own
speculation and conjecture. This is not sufficient to support the conviction.
Based on the foregoing, the conviction of Taylor should be reversed.
DATED this JZD^sZfvi
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March, 2003.
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